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PSYCHOLOGY’S ROLE IN LAW:
A DISCUSSION OF HOW THE SUPREME
COURT VIEWS THE ROLE OF THE
DSM-V IN HALL V. FLORIDA
Bryant Buechele*
WHAT role should psychology-based definitions of mental con-ditions play in death penalty cases? In Hall v. Florida, the U.S.Supreme Court reigned in state’s autonomy to apply the death
penalty, examining how a state can independently define “intellectual dis-
ability” when deciding whether a criminal is eligible for the death pen-
alty.1 In doing so, the Court limited the states’ autonomy and debated the
relevancy of independent scientific research and definitions in determin-
ing whether a criminal is intellectually disabled from a legal rather than
medical framework.2 The majority primarily argued that clinical defini-
tions are useful and should be used as a guide at the very least,3 while the
dissent contended that clinical definitions have little room in a legal
framework and thus should not be held to the esteem that the majority
attempted.4
This Note argues that the majority’s opinion in Hall v. Florida was cor-
rect: Florida’s statute for classification of a defendant as intellectually dis-
abled was unconstitutionally restrictive because it disregarded the
nuances of psychological research in diagnosing intellectual disability.
The majority promotes an inclusive viewpoint of psychology’s role in law
without being overly deferential. While the dissent makes salient points
regarding the problems with leaning on academic research that may not
represent a national consensus, in this case the use of academic research
is appropriate because the goals of psychology and law are in line: both
look for elements of intellectual disability in terms of how they affect an
individual’s deterrability. By incorporating the American Psychological
Association’s (APA) flexible standard for determining intellectual disa-
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1. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 2000.
4. See id. at 2006 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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bility, the Court prevents dependence on bright-line rules that are often
biased and inaccurate.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF DEATH PENALTY LAW
The Eighth Amendment prohibits inflicting cruel and unusual punish-
ments, and “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment applies those restrictions to
the States.”5 What constitutes cruel and unusual punishment regarding
the death penalty has been hotly debated for decades, so much so that at
one point the Supreme Court temporarily suspended the death penalty at
the federal level.6 After reinstating the death penalty as a constitutional
practice, the Supreme Court has since narrowed who is eligible for the
death penalty; most relevant to this Note are the bars on executing
juveniles7 and the intellectually disabled, on the theory that those groups
have the kind of diminished capacity that makes their crimes less culpable
and the death penalty unwarranted.8
In 2002 in Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court recognized that a na-
tional consensus had developed against the practice of executing intellec-
tually disabled criminals.9 Applying the principles of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the Court determined that executing such per-
sons was unconstitutional.10 A crucial part of the decision rested on the
idea that mentally retarded criminals, now referred to as “intellectually
disabled,” have diminished capacity to “process information, to learn
from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses . . .
[which] make[s] it less likely that they can process the information of the
possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their conduct
based upon that information.”11 The defendant’s inability to understand
the concept of the death penalty takes away a basic rationale for using
it—the idea that we can use the possibility of that punishment to deter
individuals from “murderous conduct.”12 The Court established that in-
tellectually disabled criminals are not eligible for the death penalty, but it
left to the states the implementation of this new restriction.13
II. INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY IN PSYCHOLOGY
Influential in the Atkins decision was the clinical definition of intellec-
tual disability, which has three levels of analysis.14 Clinical definitions of
this disorder are based on a finding of “subaverage intellectual function-
5. Id. at 1992 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005)); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII; U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
6. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
7. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
8. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002).
9. Id. at 315-16.
10. Id. at 321.
11. Id. at 320.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 317.
14. See id. at 318.
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ing, [as well as] significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communi-
cation, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest before age
18.”15 Psychologists understand that intelligence quotient (IQ) tests, the
primary way of measuring intellectual functioning, should not be used to
create a definitive intelligence number, and thus the Diagnostic and Sta-
tistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) places equal weight on the
second criterion of adaptive functioning to get a more accurate overall
assessment of an individual’s true intelligence level.16
IQ tests are not used without context of other behavioral factors be-
cause of the errors inherent in the test and their cultural bias.17 IQ tests
necessarily must take into account the Standard Error of Measurement
(SEM), which reflects the inaccuracy of IQ tests and the flexibility
needed to use them.18 The SEM of the IQ tests in Hall indicated that with
a 95% confidence interval, the true intelligence level would be within
about five points of the score indicated by the test, but attempting to
narrow the score range quickly reduces the confidence level.19 IQ tests
are further criticized for being culturally biased, possibly creating false
positive indications of intellectual disability among non-white, lower in-
come test-takers.20
In clinical situations, adaptive functioning is measured using standard-
ized tests given to family members or friends, measuring how indepen-
dently individuals can operate to possibly demonstrate their decision-
making capabilities or capacity to process information.21 Each of these
measurements, IQ score and adaptive functioning, by themselves are not
capable of determining whether an individual is intellectually disabled,
but when used together they can be much more useful in diagnosing intel-
lectual disability.22 Building on that logic, the Court in Hall found that a
Florida statute that effectively did not account for factors beyond the
somewhat faulty IQ test was unconstitutionally limited in scope.23
III. INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY IN HALL
After Atkins, many states created statutes that defined who is intellec-
tually disabled to avoid assigning the death penalty to those criminals
who fall within that diagnosis.24 Under Florida’s statute, intellectual disa-
bility is defined as “significantly subaverage general intellectual function-
15. Id.
16. See Sara Reardon, Science in court: Smart enough to die?, NATURE, Feb. 19, 2014,
http://www.nature.com/news/science-in-court-smart-enough-to-die-1.14742; see also Jeffery
Usman, Capital Punishment, Cultural Competency, and Litigating Intellectual Disability, 42
U. MEM. L. REV. 855, 896-97 (2012).
17. See Usman, supra note 16, at 897-98.
18. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014).
19. See id.
20. See Usman, supra note 16, at 891.
21. See Reardon, supra note 16.
22. See id.
23. See Hall, 134 S. Ct. 1986, at 2001.
24. See id. at 1996.
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ing existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and
manifested during the period from conception to age 18.”25 This “signifi-
cantly subaverage general intellectual functioning” was defined in that
statute as “performance that is two or more standard deviations from the
mean score on a standardized intelligence test.”26 The Court noted that
the plain language of the statute would be constitutional, but the Florida
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute is too inflexible to define
inherently complex human characteristics.27 As applied in Florida, this
definition essentially means that anyone who scores above 70 on an IQ
test is not considered intellectually disabled for the purposes of an Atkins
proceeding; consequently, a score above 70 acts as a mandatory eviden-
tiary cutoff that prevents the defendant from providing further evidence
to show that although he scored above 70, he is in fact intellectually
disabled.28
In Hall, the Court divided 5-4, primarily on the basis of the extent that
psychological research and the professional community’s definition of in-
tellectual disability should be used in legal proceedings.29 Writing for the
majority, Justice Kennedy argued that the Court should be “informed by
the views of medical experts . . . [and although] [t]hese views do not dic-
tate the Court’s decision . . . the Court [should] not disregard these in-
formed assessments.”30 Because medical experts in the field agree that
IQ tests should not be used in isolation, the Court determined that legal
definitions of intellectual disability that rely solely on IQ tests in isolation
are inaccurate, overly rigid, and too open to the possibility of executing
intellectually disabled individuals in violation of Atkins.31 The Court ref-
erenced the fact that its decision in Atkins was primarily based on clinical
definitions of intellectual disability, and stating that intellectually disabled
individuals suffer from the kind of “diminished capacity” for understand-
ing the nature of their actions that prevents them from being deterred by
the possibility of the death penalty.32 This diminished capacity also in-
creases the probability that intellectually disabled individuals could be ex-
ecuted because they are more likely to give false confessions and are
unable to adequately represent themselves in the courtroom, possibly
leading the jury to mistake their disorder with a lack of remorse.33
IV. DISSENT’S COUNTERARGUMENTS
The dissenting opinion by Justice Alito and joined by Justices Roberts,
Scalia, and Thomas, of whom Justices Scalia and Thomas also dissented in
25. Id., 134 S. Ct. at 1994 (quoting FLA. STAT. §921.137(1) (2013)).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2000.
28. See id. at 2001.
29. See id. at 1989-90.
30. Id. at 2000 (citing Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002)).
31. See id. at 1990.
32. Id. at 1993. (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
33. See id. at 1993.
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Atkins, argued that Atkins explicitly left the issue of defining intellectual
disability to the states and should not be heavily influenced by scientific
definitions.34 In previous Eighth Amendment cases, “the Court referred
to the evolving standards of a maturing ‘society,’ . . . [meaning] the stan-
dards of American society as a whole.”35 According to the dissent, the
Court has now ignored that standard, instead following the standards of
“professional societies,” specifically the APA.36 The ideas of professional
societies are “by no means dispositive,” and, according to the dissent,
should not be followed to the extent that the majority in this case seems
to follow them.37
V. ARGUMENT ANALYSIS
The dissent inappropriately disregards the benefits of applying the
standards of professional societies, whose opinions are incredibly helpful
in this aspect of a legal framework for multiple reasons. First, a majority
of the states already have statutes that contain the more complex parts of
the DSM-V’s steps for diagnosing intellectual disability, giving some
weight to the idea that a national consensus within American society is
developing, if not already developed.38 Second, the dissent mischaracter-
izes the majority’s reliance on the DSM-V, which was much narrower in
scope than the dissent states. The majority leaves room for states to cre-
ate their own normative evaluations of intellectual disability as long as
the statutes capture the same goals and ideas of the DSM-V, even if it
does not directly follow the analytical steps found in the DSM-V.
The bright-line test used in Florida is not representative of what a ma-
jority of states use, and because of their lack of scientific validity, these
types of tests are inappropriate when deciding who lives and who dies. As
the Court stated in its opinion, “professionals who design, administer, and
interpret IQ tests have agreed, for years now, that IQ test scores should
be read not as a single fixed number but as a range,” indicating that IQ
tests are not as accurate as Florida’s statute purported them to be.39 IQ
tests by design are subject to standard errors of measurement, reflecting
the concept that “an individual’s intellectual functioning cannot be re-
duced to a single numerical score.”40 Additionally, “most defendants
have taken several IQ tests and achieved a range of scores, which can
vary widely depending on the type of test and the version used,”41 as was
the case in Hall, where the defendant took multiple IQ tests and received
scores ranging from 60 to 80; however, the scores below 70, the estab-
lished threshold score for indicating intellectual disability, were excluded
34. See id. at 2001-02 (Alito, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 2002 (emphasis in original).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2006.
38. See id. at 1996 (majority opinion).
39. Id. at 1995.
40. Id.
41. Reardon, supra note 16.
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for evidentiary reasons at trial.42 The dissent’s argument that Florida’s
statute takes care of this issue by allowing multiple IQ tests shows a mis-
understanding of what IQ tests measure and what the score is capable of
indicating.43 IQ tests do not measure decision-making ability or “ability
to function in society”—a significant factor in determining whether a per-
son is intellectually disabled to the level of being undeterrable—and this
is the primary reason why the DSM-V incorporates the criterion of adap-
tive functioning.44 A “vast majority” of states already recognize how inac-
curate IQ tests are, as shown by their statutes that incorporate more
realistic based measurements of cognitive functioning beyond the IQ test,
such as adaptive functioning.45 The Court referred to this majority as in-
dicating a “consistency in the trend” of states designing nuanced statutes
that do not have the mandatory cutoff at a certain IQ level that was pre-
sent in Florida’s statute.46
If the death penalty is reserved for the “worst of the worst,” then it is
vital that state statutes incorporate more forgiving steps to avoid this pun-
ishment.47 A mandatory cutoff of the intellectual disability analysis that
applies when a defendant scores even one point above the threshold
score of 70 is too rigid for assessing a condition that exists on a range and
cannot be accurately measured by a score alone. Florida’s statute is one
of only a few state statutes that use a bright-line test,48 indicating that it
does not rise to the level of a developing national consensus, and its lim-
ited analysis is uncomfortably more likely to allow intellectually disabled
criminals to be executed.
Even if clinical definitions are not easily applied in the courtroom, the
majority stated that scientific research is not dispositive of law and thus
allows states to create a valid normative way to define intellectual disabil-
ity that captures the goal of Atkins.49 Some commenters interpret Hall as
limiting states to follow the guidelines of the DSM-V and extrapolate that
Hall may result in psychology having an inappropriate influence on law.50
The criticism comes from the idea that psychological concepts are diffi-
cult to apply in a legal framework, mainly because of the layman’s diffi-
culty of applying academic theory to real world situations.51 Instead, the
Court seems to leave open the possibility for states to create their own
definition of intellectual disability, as long as it reaches the goal of
preventing individuals who, because of their deficits in understanding,
42. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1992.
43. See id. at 1995.
44. Reardon, supra note 16.
45. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1998.
46. Id.
47. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006).
48. See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1996.
49. See id.
50. See Christopher Slobogin, Scientizing Culpability: The Implications of Hall v. Flor-
ida and the Possibility of a “Scientific Stare Decisis” 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forth-
coming) (manuscript at 7) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2477862).
51. See id. at 8.
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have less moral culpability for their actions.52 It is because Florida incor-
rectly used clinical definitions that the statute was questionable, implying
that if a state chooses to use clinical definitions, it must use enough of the
clinical definition to meet the underlying goals of the medical diagnosis.53
Normative evaluations that would be applied by a jury could create
unjust results if juries mistake a defendant’s disability for a lack of re-
morse.54 Atkins recognized the probability that intellectually disabled de-
fendants would make poor witnesses and could be more likely to make
false confessions or seem unremorseful to a jury who does not encounter
intellectual disability often.55 To prevent this, the DSM-V’s definition
should at least be a guide with a primary focus on the adaptive function-
ing of the defendant. Florida’s law strayed too far from that guide be-
cause it ignored the importance of the adaptive functioning assessment;
however, it may be possible for states to create their own normative defi-
nition of intellectual disability as long as it captures both components of
intellectual functioning and adaptive function as laid out in Atkins.
In Hall, the Court clarified its previous decision in Atkins, essentially
stating that although states may create their own definitions of intellec-
tual disability for death penalty purposes, they must use established
clinical definitions as a base guide.56 Further, using only the most rigid
part of the clinical definition, as was the case in Florida, is incorrect be-
cause it does not achieve the goal of preventing those who lack the ability
to engage in logical reasoning and appropriate decision-making from re-
ceiving the “harshest of punishments” while still holding them accounta-
ble for their actions.57
VI. FUTURE OF THE DEATH PENALTY
With the death penalty continuously losing popularity among U.S. citi-
zens, the Court recognized this growing trend by further narrowing the
application of the death penalty.58 At the very least, a narrowed applica-
tion of the death penalty should spark serious discussions about the
United States’ use of the death penalty in the future. Criticism of the
death penalty often comes in various forms, including the inaccuracy of
jury verdicts and the possibility of executing an innocent person,59 the
52. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
53. See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1994.
54. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.
55. See id.
56. See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1998-99.
57. Id. at 1992.
58. See Shrinking Majority of Americans Support Death Penalty, PEWRESEARCH, Mar.
28, 2014, http://www.pewforum.org/2014/03/28/shrinking-majority-of-americans-support-
death-penalty/.
59. See Ed Pilkington, US death row study: 4% of defendants sentenced to die are inno-
cent, THEGUARDIAN, Apr. 28, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/28/death-
penalty-study-4-percent-defendants-innocent (stating that a new study indicates that
roughly 4% of death row inmates in the U.S. are likely innocent).
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questionable deterrence effect of the death penalty,60 and the exorbitant
expense of the execution process as compared to a life sentence.61 As of
2012, “[o]ver two-thirds of the countries in the world – 141 – have now
abolished the death penalty . . . [and] the overwhelming majority of all
known executions took place in . . . China, Iran, North Korea, Yemen,
and the United States.62 There may be benefits to using the death pen-
alty, but such a permanent and powerful procedure deserves
introspection.
VII. CONCLUSION
States may not be required to strictly follow the APA’s clinical defini-
tion of intellectual disability after Hall, but the path of least resistance
would be to use the clinical definition as closely as possible. The Court’s
primary concern with the Florida statute was that it used a bright-line test
that was too rigid for an issue as serious as deciding whether or not a
criminal should be executed. After Hall, a statute defining intellectual
disability should be flexible and fluid enough to give defendants who may
be intellectual disabled the appropriate avenues to provide evidence of
their disability that accounts for the complexity of human mental
conditions.
60. DEATH PENALTY FACTS, AMNESTY USA, (last updated May 2012), http://
www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/DeathPenaltyFactsMay2012.pdf.
61. Id.
62. Id.
